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June 2016 (published: 20.06.2016)
Number 2(25)
Home > Issue > Optimal auction`s design: the search for solutions outside of procedure
Khvalynskiy D.S.
The paper is devoted to one of the main revelation mechanisms in the sale & procurement of goods – auctions. Auction theory, actively developing in the world economic science, subdivides all auctions to effective and optimal. In this paper we attempt to find the design of the real optimal auction, providing the condition that the players are telling the truth about its value and it is their dominant strategy. Most of the works of foreign researchers consider the level of competition as the main condition for the value revelation. The author proposes to consider as the main conditions the subjective attitude of a bidder to the probability of his winning the auction, as well as the new design of standard auction. Introduction the possibility of concluding a contract with any interested party who did not participate in the auction at a price higher than the bid of the winner, can have a direct impact on the revelation mechanism and to make a dominant strategy of the bidder to reveal real value of the object auctioned. The proposed auction design can significantly increase the revenue of standard auction and, primarily, auctions held in Russia for the sale of public property & public procurement.
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Keywords: Auction; the optimal auction; profitability; efficiency; government procurement; the equivalence theory of income; the contract; the mechanism of identification; mechanism design.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License
UDC 351.72
Optimal auction`s design: the search for solutions outside of procedure
The paper is devoted to one of the main revelation mechanisms in the sale & procurement of goods – auctions. Auction theory, actively developing in the world economic science, subdivides all auctions to effective and optimal. In this paper we attempt to find the design of the real optimal auction, providing the condition that the players are telling the truth about its value and it is their dominant strategy. Most of the works of foreign researchers consider the level of competition as the main condition for the value revelation. The author proposes to consider as the main conditions the subjective attitude of a bidder to the probability of his winning the auction, as well as the new design of standard auction. Introduction the possibility of concluding a contract with any interested party who did not participate in the auction at a price higher than the bid of the winner, can have a direct impact on the revelation mechanism and to make a dominant strategy of the bidder to reveal real value of the object auctioned. The proposed auction design can significantly increase the revenue of standard auction and, primarily, auctions held in Russia for the sale of public property & public procurement.
Read the full article
Keywords: Auction; the optimal auction; profitability; efficiency; government procurement; the equivalence theory of income; the contract; the mechanism of identification; mechanism design.
DOI 10.17586/2310-1172-2016-9-2-43-47